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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I ask what should be the assignment of 
liability for risks of toxic chemicals, and more generally. I 
develop a theory of liability, based on two principles. The 
first is responsibility as own-cost-bearing and is justified on 
the grounds of fairness. The second is efficiency and is 
justified on the grounds of welfare. These two principles 
provide a joint foundation to the theory of incentive 
compatibility, which is an important consideration in the design 
of liability systems, 
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For more than 20 years Rohm and Haas manufactured 
chloromethyl-methyl-ether in its production of ion exchange 
resins , The chemical, along with a contaminant, bis-chloromcthyl­
ether (BC!tffi) was batched up in large kettles, which were tended by 
workers, who in turn were exposed to their fumes , Workers began 
dying of lung cancer, and especially of a relatively rare form of 
lung cancer, an oat cell carcinoma . At first the management 
thought the cause was smoking, and told the workers so . Over 
several years the epidemiologic and bioassay evidence accumulated 
and increasingly identified BC!tffi as the cause of the "excess" 
cancers . Rohm and Haas changed its process, but once exposed 
workers continued to die . By 1974, about 50 deaths were attributed 
to DC!illi, the deaths most clearly linked to the chemical, Several 
families sued Rohm and Haas, but eventually all settled out of 
court . 
In this paper we ask what should be the assignment of 
l iability for risks imposed by chemicals . Should there be strict 
liability or not? Should "unknowability" be a legal excuse? (1] . 
Does it matter in an essential way whether those who may be 
inj ured by chemicals are in contractual relationships with the 
manufacturers or distributors of the chemicals ? 
The paper proceeds as follows . I begin by describing 
principle of responsibility which identifies a transfer of harm 
and distinguishes between the actor and the acted upon.  The 
principle is asymmetric as it points to a direction in assigning 
responsibilities. 
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I then consider an obj ection to this principle . Ronald 
Coase [2]  argued that the concept of harm is reciprocal and that 
it is not possible to distinguish the actor and the acted upo n . 
Coase argued especially against A.C . Pigou, who used the 
responsibility principle in his analysis of economic externalities 
[3] .  Instead of the responsibility principle Coase argued in 
favor of an efficiency principle . The dispute between Coase and 
Pigou is particularly interesting because (without much 
exaggeration) one can say that Coase was the founder of law and 
ecomonics and Pigou was the founder of the economic analysis o f  
pollution and congestion problems , 
Although the general impression is that Coase and Pigou 
are strongly at odds, I find that foundationally they are 
surprisingly close . Pigou also uses an efficiency principle, 
which turns out to be the same as Coases's efficiency principle , 
The dif ference between Pigou and Coase is that Pigou used both 
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responsibility and efficiency principles while Coase used only the 
latter. However, I find nothing in Coase showing that the two 
principles are incompatible . And Coase ' s  examples, chosen to 
illustrate the reciprocal nature of harm, are more asymmetric than 
they first appear, thus permitting application of the 
responsibility principle . 
The question then arises : perhaps it is not an exclusive 
choice between the efficiency and responsibility principles, 
Pursuing this question, I find that the two principles provide a 
j oint foundation to the economic theory of incentive 
compatibility. This theory is central to the understanding of 
tort law systems because of the central problems in the 
implementation of tort law, of fact finding and incentives to 
misrepresent, And in the theory of incentive compatability, I 
find that the responsibility and efficiency principles are not 
only not in conflict, they are complementary. 
The argument of the paper suggests several things : First, 
a greater emphasis on strict liability and correspondingly less 
emphasis on negligence. Second, a greater attention to problems 
of incentive compatibility, especially when there is asymmetric 
and fragmentary information. Third, a contrast with the way 
philosophers and legal scholars often look at principles of 
responsibility and efficiency. It is commonly held that both 
responsibility and efficiency are appealing normative concepts> 
but are in conflict. One has to give up something of one to get 
more of the other. This paper suggests that such conflict is not 
inevitable and that it may be useful to look for ways in which 
various normative principles s upport each other. 
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A few words on the history of ideas may provide a context 
for this paper. Fletcher [ 4] traces how, beginning in the mid­
nineteenth century, tort law has increasingly been viewed as a 
mechanism for maximizing social utility and efficiency. Coase's 
famous paper of 1960 strengthened this trend, and reliance on 
efficiency, often to the exclusion of other normative principles, 
became a defining feature of the new field of law and economics. 
In response, Fletcher, Epstein [5], Coleman (6] and others have 
attempted to ground tort law on normative principles other than 
efficiency. This paper is part of that response. But instead of 
focusing on some single alternative to the efficiency principle, I 
explore the complementary nature of two normative princ iples -­
responsibility and efficiency. 
I. The Responsibility Principle 
We start with the common sense principle "When A's notions 
impose costs on B, A should be made responsible, by paying for 
these costs. " I interpret the principle, which I will call the 
"responsibility principle," as a distributive principle . It tells 
us in which direction cost bearing should go. In particular, the 
principle does not say that B should pay A to reduce the costs, 
nor does it say that A should necessarily pay B. 
To apply the principle we need to be able to identify an 
actor A, a transfer of harm or cost, and a recipient B .  In the 
transfer there is a notion of cause or action on A's part. 
"Making A responsible" includes the idea of a disincentive or 
constraint on A to affect A ' s  behavior or wel fare, 
5 
Although the principle is general, the language of causal 
flow incorporated in the responsibility principle is particularly 
apt for problems of potentially toxic chemicals. Some chemicals 
do cause physical harm. In epidemiology and toxicology, where the 
evidence of harm is developed, the language of causality is 
routinely used in sophisticated, operational detail [ 7] .  
I am not saying that the principle is not problematic 
the notions of both cause and harm are problematic. Nonetheless, 
in most cases, most people will agree on which way the principle 
points. They may disagree on how far it points (on how much 
responsibility, how strong the incentive, is enough). But, as I 
have stated it, the principle is silent on the appropriate degree 
of the responsibility. How much is not part of the principle; the 
fact that it points is its essence. It is a principle of 
asymmetry. 
The principle is applied so ubiquitously in our everyday 
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life that it often goes unnoticed and unremarked, When a firm 
employs a worker, it transfers costs to the worker by taking his 
time and setting him to often unpleasant and repetitive tasks . It 
seems natural for us to think that the firm should pay something 
for these costs. Paying for its labor, we say uncontroversially, 
is simply a cost of doing business. 
The principle of responsibility as own cost bearing is 
more ubiquitous than it casually appears, partly because it. is so 
often implemented automatically, without direct state 
intervention. In ordinary business transactions the principle is 
automatically implemented, as long as the transactions are 
characteriz ed by the two conditions of voluntary exchange : 
excludability and refusability. In everyday life traditions of 
reciprocity (and sometimes refusal when reciprocity is lacking) 
help implement the principle. 
The normative appeal of the principle rests in large part, 
I think, on a simple idea of fairness. Thus we say that it is 
fair for you to pay for the costs you impose on others, and more 
strongly, it is unfair for you to impose costs on others without 
bearing at least some cost. In economic contexts, of which we are 
mostly concerned, another way of putting the matter is that 
economic actors should do their own cost bearing. 
The principle is applied widely in pollution cases. For 
example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD ls an organ i zation includ ing Western European 
countr ies , the U . S . , and Japan) adopted the princ iple that "the 
polluter should bear the expenses of prevent ing and controll ing 
pollution" [8] .  Again w e  say that i t  i s  a cost of doing bus iness 
for a firm to pay for its own pollution abatement and for the cost 
of pollution which is unabated. 
The appeal of the responsib il ity princ iple may help 
e xplain an inc ident in Syracuse , New York j ust after an especially 
heavy fallout of soot and ash from a power plant belonging to 
Syracuse Univers ity . Several economists decided that this was an 
opportune time to ask residents for their w ill ingness to pay for 
cleaner air, while the inc ident was fresh in their m inds . Many of 
the res idents were incensed by the phrasing of the question. Why 
should they have to pay anyth ing? The un iversity had inj ured them 
[ 9 ] .  
The principle i s  applied not j ust in econom ics . It i s  at 
the heart of crim inal law . We are told "Use a gun, go to j ail . "  We 
are told that when one intent ionally harms another he should be 
made to pay (and it is understood that "he" refers to the injurer 
not the vict im). When the Godfather "makes an offer you cannot 
refuse" we sm ile because we see r ight through the offer to an 
e xtort ionary threat and coercive causation, 
The respons ibil ity principle is an underp inning of tort 
law as well . In nuisance law we f ind frequent use of the word 
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"cause, " much argument as to the actual causes, and frequent (but 
not un iversal) j udgment against the "causer" of a nu isance. Civil 
law and crim inal law share the common foundation of the 
responsibil ity princ iple; where the two differ is in the notion of 
intent ionality in crim inal law . (A second underpinn ing in tort 
law is efficiency; and we also f ind frequent reference to the 
weigh ing of utilit ies.) 
For my purposes it is important to note that the 
respons ibility pr inc iple, as stated at the beg inning of the 
sect ion, does not require us to think of A as the "bad guy" 
deserving blame . The association of the princ iple w ith crim inal 
law may tempt us in that d irection, but I want to resist the 
temptation . We can think of praise and blame , l ike intent ion, as 
separate concepts which may, or may not, be attached to the 
responsibility princ iple . In the case of BCME , Rohm and Haas d i d  
not pounce upon the techn ical faults a n d  ambiguities o f  the 
studies (there always are faults and amb iguit ies) and delay 
remedial action on the grounds that BOIE had not been proven to be 
the cause of the excess cancers . Instead , when it became clear 
that the b ioassays and epidem iology suggested that it was l ikely 
that BOIE was a potent carc inogen , Rohm and Haas promptly changed 
the process and greatly reduced exposure. When one f inds reasons 
to blame it is easier to allocate respons ib il ity. I am 
particularly interested in the harder but purer case where A's 
actions are un t ainted by malice, sloth, or the in ten tion to do 
h arm . 
Pigou, who was one of the firs t e conomis ts to wri te about 
the problem of environmental and social costs, adop ted the 
perspec tive of the untainted case. As he put. i t, 
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" the essence of the m a t ter is tha t one person A in the 
course of rendering some service, for which payment is 
made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders 
services or disservices, to o ther persons C, D and E, of 
such a sor t tha t technical considera tions preven t payment 
being extracted from the benefited parties or compensa tion 
being enforced on behal f of the injured parties." (p. 159 
( 1932 edi tion)) . 
No malice, no bad int.en tion, bu t s till the same asymmetry, When A 
h arms C, D or E, according to Pigou, A pays, Pigou suggested 
res trictive zoning and t a xes (what we would now call externality 
t a xes) as disincentives to restri c t  A's harmful activi ties . 
Besides harm, Pigou added the o ther logical possibility tha t  A 
could benefit C, D, and E, in which case by the asymmetric 
principle A should be paid a "boun ty" or o therwise benefited. 
As I h ave defined i t, the responsibili ty of bearing one's 
own costs is a partial principle . I t  says some thing abou t what 
should happen to A when A's ac tions genera te costs. It does no t 
s ay what should happen to B who may involun tarily bear the cos ts. 
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A second partial principle of responsibility is that wpen A's 
actions place costs on B (or harm B), B's well-being should be 
res tored , This second par tial principle of responsibili ty is one 
of restitution or correc tive j us tice , I t  is possible to link the 
two par tial principles toge ther so tha t  wha t  A pays is wha t  B 
gets. But i t  is impor tant to note tha t  the two principles can be 
considered separa tely. What A pays is not necessarily the same 
thing as wha t  B ge ts . Separating the two partial principles of 
responsibility allows us another degree of freedom in designing 
institutions. For example, we may be able to find fairer and more 
efficient ways of compensa ting B than by relying on j oin t-and­
several liability , As another example of the separation of the 
two principles in criminal law, we rely on the first partial 
principle but not on the second, When A inj ures B in a s tree t 
crime, the government a ttempts to punish and restrain A, bu t 
lit tle is done to compensate B. 
Jn one form or another the responsibility principle goes 
back many centuries. In "Exodus" we find both partial principles 
combined : 
"When a man causes a field or vineyard to be grazed 
over, or lets his beast loose and it feeds in ano ther 
man's field, he shall make res titution from the bes t in 
his own field and in his own vineyard . "  (Exodus, Ch . 22, 
v. 5) . 
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In my own view , to deal adequately with toxic risks we 
need some form of both principles (bu t no t necessarily making A's 
payment the same thing as B's rest i tu tion ) ,  While j us tified on 
the grounds of fairness , the principle of responsibility as own 
cost bearing provides incentives for A to undertake precautionary 
ac tions , Because we are dealing with po tentially grave harms , 
there is o f ten no possibility of restoring B's well-being once 
harmed. Thus it is especially impor tant to get the decisions of 
adequate precaution right in the first place . At the same time , 
because we are dealing with potentially grave harms , i t  is also 
impor tant no t to forget B once harmed, In this paper I will say 
relatively lit tle about the second principle , responsibility as 
res t i tu tion, This is not because I think that the second partial 
principle is not impor tant -- I think it is -- but because I wish 
to concentra te on the first partial principle. In particular I am 
interested in the complementari ty be tween the two norma tive 
principles of responsibili ty and e f ficiency , Since the firs t 
partial principle of responsibility gets most of the a t tention in 
this paper , for brevity, when there is no confusion , I will refer 
to it as I introduced i t ,  as the "responsibility principle. " When 
there mig h t  be confusion , I will refer to it as the first partial 
principle or "responsibili ty as own cost bearing." 
Responsibility as own cost bearing need not always mean 
that the causal au thor of a harm should be liable, nor need 
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liabili ty always rest on this principle, The tradi tional legal 
excuses of coercion and i gnorance may apply . If A is coerced or 
is j us tifiably ignorant ,  his ac tion may be involun tary, not  
"really his action, "  and hence the responsibility principle 
inapplicable (on the grounds of lack of a gency) , In such a case, 
a causal au thor migh t be excused from liability, Going the o ther 
way, an omission , such as a failure to warn , might be viewed as a 
failure of an affirmative dut y  and a ground for liability or some 
d ther sanction . In such a case one mig h t  be held liable without 
being a direc t causal author, 
Where there is uncertaint y ,  the cost A imposes on B is 
of ten in the form of a risk, in other words , in the increased 
probability of harm, Thus when A drives his car he imposes an 
increased risk of injury to o ther drivers and pedestrians. Under 
the interpreta tion of responsibility developed in this paper , we 
should hold A responsible for this increased risk. And in 
practice we do so in several ways, We may require A to bear the 
burden of the risk , .!!A an te, by requiring him to buy insurance , 
We may also require A to bear the burden of the risk ex pos t ,  by 
requiring him to pay the cost of accidents he causes, Or we may 
require a mix of the two, 
In addi tion, since A's driving imposes increased risks to 
the B's (pedestrians and o thers), which are involun tarily borne 
from the point of view of the B's , we may establish affirmative 
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duties constraining A's activities , We require A to be licensed 
and to pass driving tests and obey speed laws . And when A fails 
these duties, for example by speeding or reckless driving, we not 
only hold A responsible by fining him or suspending his license, 
but we also characterize the failure as "wrong" or "blameworthy." 
Going the other way , if A stays within the bounds o f  the 
prescribed duties and still causes an accident , we do not 
ordinarily think of his action ns blameworthy , even though A 
imposes a harm , which is involuntarily borne by the victim , [10] 
Taking into account the possibility of excuses and 
a ffirmative duties , the responsibility principle of fers an answer 
to the original question: "!low should liability be assigned ?" It 
says the initial assignment should be to A .  
According to this principle , Rohm and llaas should be 
liable (or held responsible in some way) . Depending on the 
strength of the view, it suggests that liability should be strict 
and there should be no "unknowability" excuse. By m aking Rohm and 
H a as pay liability damages , the company is given the incentive to 
be more careful in the future; by having a rule of strict 
l iability in place be forehand , the company , and other companies 
like it, is given on incentive to undertake testing and to avoid 
the harm in the first place. 
In his discussion of environmental problems Pigou said 
little about either partial principle of responsibility , Il used 
the principle of responsibility as own cost bearing as though it 
were so natural it needed no discussion or j ustification . In 
addition Pigou adopted the efficiency principle , From 1 91 2  the 
time of his first edition of Economics of Welf�re , to 1960, 
economists considered Pigou's approach the conventional and 
obvious way of treating these problems . But in 1960 Conse 
published his attack on the "Pigovian tradition," 
I I .  Obiections 1.2. the Responsibility Principle 
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In the "Problem of Social Cost" Coase does not tell us 
explicitly what his normative criteria are or how they differ from 
Pigou's , but it is clear that Coase's main criterion is 
e fficiency . I will take the e fficiency principle to say: "If 
social state x is a potential Pareto improvement over social state 
y, then x should be chosen over y; further , any social state which 
is chosen should be Pareto optimal . "  As far as I know, Coase does 
not use the term Pareto optimal in the paper , although he refers 
to "optimal" (pp . 6, 16 , 41), "optimum" (p. 13), "efficiency" ( p ,  
1 8  ( twice)) -- all in ways consistent with a criterion of 
e fficiency , Further he refers to improving the value of the j oint 
product of A and B (pp , 1 5 ,  16 (twice)) and weighing the net gains 
and losses of alternative social arrangements and choosing the one 
with the greatest net gain (pp . 26, 27), Under conventional 
assumptions in welfare economics this process of weighing the 
value of j oin t produc tion and maximizing n e t  gains leads to 
e fficiency, 
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Conse asser ts at the beginning of his paper that the 
problem is reciprocal, Not to restrain A is to allow B to be 
harmed . But "To avoid harm to B would inflic t harm on A," (p . 2). 
The implici t implica tion is that the types of harm are the same 
for norma tive purposes . 
Coase's policy prescription is in two s teps . Firs t rights 
are defined and alloca ted (B might be given a righ t to be free 
from inj ury or A a righ t to inj ure), The second s tep is to let A 
and B bargain (with cour ts protec ting rights and making bargains 
s tick) . Coase found that in the idealized case of two parties and 
zero bargaining costs that no mat ter which way the rights were 
ini tially defined and allocated the result from bargaining would 
be e f ficient. This result "as tonished" Stigler [11] who wrote he 
had believed o therwise for years . Bu t once poin ted ou t ,  the 
result is very simple , since Jl.y �ssumption A and B costlessly 
bargain until all the gains of trade are squeezed out and by 
defini tion the resulting situation is efficient [12], 
To accept Coas�'s asser tion that the situa tion be tween A 
and B is normatively symmetric is to rej ec t the responsibility 
principle , which consistently and asymmetrically allocates 
responsibili ty in favor of A, Apparently Coase's followers agree 
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on this rejec tion . Demse t z  [13] wrote "An e thical symme try of the 
problem should be underscored," As far as I can tell, nei ther 
Coase nor his followers of fer a reason why the situa tion is 
normatively symmetric, l11e normative symme try is simply asser ted 
as so natural it needed no discussion or j us tification, much the 
way Pigou simply asserted the normative asymme try of the 
situa tion, If anythin g ,  instead of neu trality , Coase's followers 
lean toward favoring A .  As S tigler put i t ,  "When a fac tory spews 
smoke on a thousand homes , the ideal solution is to arrange a 
compensation system whereby the homeowners pay the factory to 
install smoke reduc tion devices up to the poin t where the marginal 
cost of smoke reduction equals the sum of the marginal gains to 
the homeowners" [14] . Those who accep t the responsiblity 
principle would agree with the residents of Syracuse who failed to 
see why i t  was "ideal" for them to pay the polluter to aba te, 
Thus i t  seems that the approaches of Pigou and Conse are 
very different, Pigou sees the mat ter as asymmetric in which A 
norms B and the problem is how to restrain A .  Conse sees the 
nat ter as symme tric,  one of maximizing j oin t ne t gains, As policy 
presump tion Pigon favors taxes and zoning restric tions on A .  Conse 
favors alloca ting rights and bargaining, For Conse there is no 
prescrip tion that the alloca tion should favor B, In the case of 
significant bargaining cos t s ,  how the alloca tion comes out depends 
�pon a "neu tral" weighing of gains and losses associated with the 
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alternative possible allocations , 
But the surprisin g thing is not how wrong Pigou was, but 
how close Pigou and Coase a re ,  So f a r ,  I h ave said little about 
Pigou, besides his adoption of the asymmetric responsibility 
principle. To say more brings out the similarity between the two. 
Pigou wanted to increase economic well-being by which we 
would call today "internalizing externalities , "  In a key passa ge 
Pigou wrote : 
"Suppose there are two roads ABD and ACD both lending 
from A to D, If left to itself ,  t raffic would be so 
distributed that the trouble involved in driving a 
'representative' cart alon g each of the two roads would be 
equal, But in some circumstances , it would be possible , by 
shifting a few carts from route B to route C, greatly to 
lessen the trouble of driving those still left on B ,  while 
only slightly increasing the trouble of driving along C ,  
In these circumstances a rightly chosen measure of 
differential taxation a gainst road B would create an 
'artificial' situation superior to the 'natural' one , ( p ,  
1 94 (1920 edition)) 
Pigou deduced that the proper amount of the tax ,  per cart 
driven , was equal to the marginal congestion cost it imposed on 
others , To estimate the proper amount of tax we must bring the 
"trouble" of travel within the "measuring rod of money , "  by 
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estimating the cost of the travel time which results from a 
m arginal unit of congestion. When the appropriate externality tax 
(equal to the sum of the marginal congestion costs each driver 
imposes on others) is levied on each causer of congestion , 
economic welfare will be improved as much as possible. This meant 
to Pigou that the net g ains of t ravel congestion costs would be 
maximized , Efficiency,  in the form of maximizing the sum of 
private plus external benefits minus private minus external cost s ,
w a s  clearly an important normative principle f o r  Pigou. 
In this approach , Pigou pioneered cost-benefit analysis. 
Cost-benefit analysis , I hasten to add , is a misnomer, Cost­
benefit analysis, as it is a ctually practiced , is more than 
analysis , It is a decision procedure, with three main ingredients. 
First , it uses the distinction between private and external costs 
and between private and external gains [15], Second , it attempts 
to evaluate the costs and g ains (benefits) in some commensur ate 
way , usually as Pigou would put it, by the measuring rod of money, 
Third , it compares the sum of benefits minus costs (private plus 
external) under alternative institutional arrangements and chooses 
the arrangement which maximizes the sum of net benefits, In doing 
so , it embodies the efficiency principle , Later this principle 
would be described and more rigorously developed by Hicks , Kaldor , 
Mishan and others,  as the principle of potential Pareto 
improvement (also known as the Hicks-Kaldor criterion). The 
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particular form of the e fficiency principle embraced by Pigou was 
the simpler one of maximizing the total ne t benefits, priva te pl11s 
external , over alternative instit11 tional arrangements , To 
summarize Pigou's approach to the problem of road congestion is to 
lis t the three main ingredien ts of modern cost-benefit analysis . 
The distinc tion between priva te and external is par ticularly 
Pigou's contribution , 
A succinc t ,  and I believe ap t ,  summary of Coase's approach 
in "The Problem of Social Cost" is that Coase applied cost­
benefi t analysis to tor t law. Coase's approach is characterized by 
the same three ingredients , He also embraced the efficiency 
principle , and in the same simpler form as that used by Pigou. To 
say this is not to belit tle Coase's contribution , Before Coaso , 
tor t law was , in the words of Prosser , "an impenetrable j ungle" 
[16) . In applying cost-benefit analysis to law, Coase tamed the 
j ungle in to a formal garden. He provided a sys tematic, coherent 
view , which in developed form can be seen , for example , in 
Polinsky's An In troduc tion to Law and Economics [17), 
If I am righ t ,  that at bo t tom Conse is doing lit tle more 
than applying the cost-benefit approach that Pigou pioneered , then 
Coase's a t tack on Pigou is not what i t  seems on the surface , It is 
a classic ins tance of the son disownin g the father , while not 
noticing that he is a chip off the old block , 
Since the two efficiency approaches overlap so thoroughly 
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we can recas t the Pigovian approach in Coase's terms. Coase says , 
( for the case of zero bargaining cos ts and i gnoring the problem 
mentioned in note 12) efficiency can be obtained no ma t ter which 
way the rights are alloca ted. Thus , we can alloca te them to B .  To 
do so is consis tent with the responsibility principle , Coase says 
that the result of bargaining is efficien t ,  Nex t ,  we le t the 
government subsume the role of bargaining by having it impose the 
cost of the ex ternal damages on A, the same amoun t that would 
arise in an efficient bargain with B. Thus in terms of Coase's own 
argumen t ,  both the responsibility principle and the Pigovian 
policy prescrip tion of government restriction on A can lead to 
e fficiency, 
Coase offers examples and argues tha t Pigovian taxes lead 
to inefficiency , bu t the argumen ts fail on technical grounds [18) . 
Indeed if Coase had succeeded in constructing an e fficiency 
argument against Pigou, his a t tack would be self wounding ,  since 
we could recast his argumen t into an a t tack on one of his 
subcases. However , Baumol and Oa tes [19] and others have 
developed the Pigovian approach in rigorous de tail , so it would be 
surprising for Coase's efficiency a ttacks to succeed in woundin g 
ei ther Pigou or himself, 
I t  is impor tant to untangle the disput e  between Coase and 
Pigou, because by now a whole generation of economis ts and legal 
scholars have come to believe that Pigou was "wron g" and Coase 
"righ t" and with Pigou being wrong the responsibili ty principle 
"mis taken.11 In contras t with this now conventional view , I find 
tha t their efficiency analyses are essentially the same and both 
subs tantially "correc t." The source of the dispute is in the 
choice of normative premises : Pigou accep ts both the 
responsibility and e fficiency principles and Coase accep ts only 
the e fficiency principle . 
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The efficiency principle is symmetric, A dollar's wor th of 
bene fits accruing to A is as good as a dollar's wor th of bene fits 
accruing to B .  Since Coase relies solely on the efficiency 
principle i t  is unsurprising tha t Coase viewed e xternalities as 
symmetric . 
IV, Coase's Examples 
Coase o f fered four legal examples to show that the problem 
of social cost is symmetric, The examples were well chosen [20], 
I t  seems in each case that the cour t might decide either way in 
assigning liabili ty . His examples suggest a plausibility to his 
claim of symmetry, But the examples do not undermine the 
responsibili ty principle , because i t  is easy to identify 
complicating factors which are asymme tric, For Coase's examples 
the factors work in opposing direc tions, We cannot infer that 
they exactly offset each o ther, in these or other cases, 
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The firs t case is that of the doctor and the confec tioner, 
whose noise inter fered with the doc tor's consulting practice . The 
"stuff" of harm is the noise transferred . This observation 
suggests , prima facie , that the ac tor is A ,  the confec tioner and 
the recipient is B the doctor . 
But there are complica ting fac tors, The doctor moved next 
to the confec tioner, so we might contend that the doc tor was also 
an actor, partly causing the harm . Fur ther, the doctor did not 
complain until eight years later when he began using his 
s te thoscope, and this change in practice might be viewed partly 
causative . These complicating factors point in the opposi te 
direc tion, lending a surface plausibility to the claim that the 
entire situation is "symmetric," (The cour t decided in favor of 
the doctor.) 
In the second case a weaver used chloride of tin to dye 
his mat ting . The "stuff" of transfer was sulphate of ammonia ,  
which was released into the air b y  a neighboring manufac turer . The 
sulphate of ammonia drifted onto the weaver's property, reac ted 
with the weaver's chloride of tin, and darkened his ma t ting . 
Again by looking a t  the physical transfer, we would conclude that 
A the manufacturer caused the harm , bu t again there is a 
complica ting factor . This time A argued that the weaver's use of 
chloride of · tin was "unusual, not according to the custom of 
trade . "  Since the conventional way of finding causal a ttribution 
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is against a background of the "normal course of affairs" (21], it 
would not be surprising for the court to find that B also 
contributed to the cause of harm . The outcome of the case was 
that, although the court found B to have a right to be protected 
from A's sulphate of ammonia emissions, the inj unction against A 
was not granted . 
In the third case the lines of causality are even more 
tangled . The plaintiff found that his chimneys no longer drew 
because the defendent had erected a wall (on the defendant's own 
property) which obstructed the plaintiff's ventilation .  Normally 
we think of smoke as the stuff of harm transferred, but this time 
A's smoke harms A, not B .  B was sued on the grounds that B's 
building caused A's smoke to stay with A .  As we might expect, the 
courts had trouble deciding this one . First they decided in favor 
of the plaintiff, but reversed on appeal . 
The last case was decided on the basis of squatter's 
rights ("doctrine of the last grant"). A brewer used a ventilation 
shaft which emptied into a neighbor's well . The well owner sued 
the brewer but lost on the grounds that since the shaft had 
existed for sixty years and the brewer had used it over this time, 
the brewer had obtained the right to its further use . 
Several possible confusions lurk in Coase's examples . 
First, it is clear that while the confectioner's noise harms the 
doctor, the doctor's stethoscope does not harm the confectioner . 
As Epstein puts it, "The problem only takes on the guise of 
reciprocity when the party harmed seeks his remedy in court" (p . 
165). It is important not to confuse a physical harm with the 
effects of a remedy . 
Second, in Conse's examples, particularly in case of the 
chimneys and the wall, there are complications . In interpreting 
who is the actor, and who responsible, it is often sensible to 
view more than one party as an actor . In such cases 
responsibility may be shared, and the payment of the most 
responsible reduced . But it is a confusion to infer that the 
liabilities will be exactly offset, or that because there muy be 
shared responsibility, the responsibility principle does not 
apply . (I will shortly discuss examples of j oint responsibility 
from Pigou and the theory of incentive compatibility . )  
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And third, the problems of interpretation encountered in 
applying the responsibility principle to Coase's approach, which 
focuses on economic cost and j oint production of cost, is simpler 
and more parsimonious . But this too is a confusion, The same 
ingredients which underlie the responsibility principle are 
entailed in the concept of economic cost . To apply the 
responsibility principle it is necessary to identify the four 
ingredients: actors, causal transfer, harm and recipient . The 
economic concept of cost entails the concept of a production 
function . A production function, in turn, embodies a concept of 
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factors which can vary and a causal transfer between a particular 
choice of factors and an outcome. The choices are made by acto_.!.§., 
Changes in well-being are associated with alternative outcomes 
determined by the factors, The changes in well-being define the 
costs or harms to individuals, the recipients. The same four 
ingredients are built into the concept of economic cost. More 
generally, these four ingredients underly the concept of an 
economic game, as I still illustrate in the next section. 
Pigou's example of highway congestion is simpler than 
Coase's examples . Each driver on the congested route is an A, 
imposing congestion costs on every other driver on that route (and 
each driver on the congested route is also a B as he waits in 
lfoe). The toll, or congestion tax, falls on each A, in the role 
of a source of congestion, in proportion to the marginal damage he 
imposes on others. The situation is asymmetric in that each A 
pays and is not paid to drive less, The net result looks 
symmetric because every driver on the congested route imposes 
congestion costs on the others and every driver pays, But in the 
example, Pigou does not call for restitution of each B's loss in 
welfare from others' actions (only for an efficient reduction in 
congestion) . 
An example which separates the roles of A and B is that of 
an airport and nearby homeowners . The example may at first seem 
symmetric in causation. It is sometimes argued that by moving 
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near the airport and then complaining of aircraft noise the 
homeowners cause harm to the airport, At the same time, o f  
course, the aircraft cause harm t o  the homeowners. Nonetheless, a 
straightforward application of the responsibility principle 
suggests that the stuff of harm is the noise, and that it comes 
from A the airport, and goes to B the homeowners. Thus the 
airport should bear a restrictive disincentive on its production 
of noise. The responsibility principle, as own cost bearing, does 
not say that B should be compensated, And in fact, to preserve 
efficient incentives, the homeowners should not be compensated 
conditioned .Q!! living close 1Q the airport. Avoiding such 
conditional compensation avoids an incentive for too many people 
to live close to the airport, ( I f  we wish to maintain ef ficient 
incentives and to apply, in addition, the principle of 
responsibility as restitution the homeowners could be compensated, 
conditioned on their locating before the airport was built or on 
the airport's efficient noise level after their locating . ) 
The point is that in the airport example the 
responsibility principle as own cost bearing is consistent with 
efficiency, and it is easy to identify A, B, and the stuff o f  
harm, The usual dif ficult cases are where the various ingredients 
of the responsibility principle point in opposing directions, as 
in Coase's examples, or when there is j oint causation on B's part . 
When the recipient's actions j ointly contribute to the harm, then 
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by the responsibility principle itself, A's liability is reduced . 
Thus in the example of highway congestion, each A contributes only 
a small part of this total harm, and correspondingly pays only for 
a small part of the total harm . 
V. Incentive Compatibility 
The asymmetry inherent in the responsibility principle and 
Pigou's use of it surfaces (surprisingly) in the theory of 
incentive compatibility, which deals with incentives to 
misrepresent . To see this, consider the problem of choosing the 
level of a public good . For efficiency, the standard theory goes, 
the government attempts to maximize the sum of individuals' true 
willingness to pay . However, if the government asks individuals 
to report their willingness to pay, for alternative levels of the 
public good, there will be incentives to misrepresent and to "free 
ride . "  
Under the most known and studied procedure for dealing 
with this problem, the Groves mechanism, each individual is made 
responsible for the consequences of his actions . For each 
individual i the level of the public good is first calculated on 
the basis of the sum of everyone but i's reported willingness to 
pay and then on the basis of the sum of everyone's, including i's, 
reported willingness to pay . The difference between the two sums 
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of willingness to pay of others is the "harm" resulting from i's 
action (his action is his representation of his willingness to pay 
and its impact on the collective choice) . The fundamental result 
is that by requiring i pay this difference, the procedure induces 
a dominant strategy for truthful reporting . Each individual i is 
made responsible for the harm he imposes on others and in 
consequence all have truthful dominant strategies . 
The essential ingredients of the theory of incentive 
compatibility are : (i) a strategy set for each individual from 
which he chooses his action (his report in the Groves mechanism); 
(ii) a j oint outcome "determined" by the individual actions and 
the game form (the chosen level of the public good) ; (iii) a 
measure of harm from each i's action (the net benefits to each 
recipient j with and without i's action); (iv) each i is made 
responsible for his action by being made to pay for this harm; and 
(v) the payment is to the government and there is no "budget 
balance." 
lbe surprising thing is that this is the same list of 
features which appear in Pigou's analysis of highway congestion . 
Each driver has a strategy set which des cribes his choice of 
routes; the j oint decision causes the congestion; each driver is 
assessed for the harm he imposes on others; he pays for this harm 
but not to the inj ured parties , Thus Pigou's asymmetric analysis 
is an antecedent to the theory of incentive compatibility (an 
unwi t ting an tecedent I might add, since Pigou was not addressing 
the problem of misrepresenta tion). 
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The responsibility principle provides a way of explicitly 
cons tructing incentive compa tible mechanisms in particular 
si tuations , The idea is that one takes the costs A·imposes on 
others, as represented by the others (the B's), and in ternalizes 
these cos ts by imposing them back on A (making A responsible) ,  
What happens to B (as the recipient) is trea ted as a separate 
matter. The result is "almost" efficient. [ 22] 
I have said that the difference be tween Pigou and Coase is 
that Pigou used both responsibility and e fficiency principles , 
while Coase used the efficiency principle alone . Since Coase and 
his followers do not rely on the responsibility principle they 
must use some other source of asymmetry to assign liabilities , or 
to conclude it does not matter how liabilities are assigned and to 
rely on a chance mechanism, 
In law and economics it is fairly standard to conclude 
that it does matter how the liabili ties are assigned and to 
introduce asymmetries, but not by means of the responsibility 
principle . For example, both Calabresi and Demse t z  [23] suggest 
tha t liabili ties be assigned to the party which is the "least cost 
avoider." Polinsky [24] suggests that if informa tion is asymmetric 
in such a way that the cour t knows B's harm , as a function of A's 
ac tivity, bu t not the benefits of A's activity, then ef ficiency is 
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improved by assigning liability against A. 
Since neither approach is an application of the 
responsibility principle , we might suspect that these approaches 
will create perverse incentives to misrepresent. And indeed they 
do. In each , to obtain the favored assignment of liability , the 
inj urer A has incentives to misrepresent by claiming the 
prevention costs are higher than they are and their estima tion is 
more highly certain than is actually the case , B has incentives to 
misrepresent by claiming that the damage costs are more cer tain 
and higher than they actually are. 
V. Responsibility, Efficiency, and Incentives Compatibility 
Under the responsibility principle we think it f air for a 
firm to pay for the cost it imposes on others , as a cost of doing 
business. We think it fair for a firm to pay for its labor,  and 
when a firm decreases its labor cost by substituting capital for 
labor , we think it fair for the firm to pay for i ts remaining 
labor (even though it pays "twice" for its remaining labor -- once 
for the subs titu ting capital and again for the labor itsel f) , We 
think 'i t fair , as a cost of doing business , for a firm to pay for 
the pollution it generates, both for its abatemen t and for its 
residual damage , We think i t  fair , as a cost of doing business , 
when the cost is in the form of a toxici ty risk, for the firm to 
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pay for this cos t of risk as well. 
In this last case the firm is genera ting a lo t tery , with 
probabilities of harm, A firm can do research to assess the 
probabilities, bnt as a practical ma t ter the firm will not be able 
to assess precisely the likelihood of toxicity associa ted with a 
chemical by any finite amoun t of testing. Even the be s t  tests 
hove error r ates. 
To pu t the ma t ter blun tly , when a chemical firm decides to 
produce a chemical involving some risk of toxici ty , i t  is gambling 
with the health of its workers, i ts customers, and/or the public 
a t  large. Within cons traints we allow firms to take these gambles 
because there are of ten large benefi ts associa ted with them (and 
as a practical ma t ter it is no t possible to avoid risk 
al toge ther) , Under the view of responsibility developed in this 
paper , we do not blame firms for creating such gambles , And when 
a firm bets on the wrong horse ( the chemical turns 'out to be more 
toxic than predic ted} this outcome is not by i tself blamewor thy 
the firm simply bet on the wrong horse , Where there is 
uncer taint.y ,  mis takes are inevi table. None theless , when a firm 
be ts on the wrong horse, i t  pays for the consequences -- partly as 
a m a t ter of fairness and responsiblity as own cos t bearing and 
par tly to provide incentives for ef ficiency in research and in 
precau tionary behavior , and to avoid incentives to misrepresent 
[ 25 ] .  
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In addi tion to holding a firm to the consequences of i ts 
actions , we may impose cons traints in the form of a ffirmative 
duties, for example , duties to repor t test resul ts , ( Sec tion 5 of 
the Toxic Subs t ances Con trol Ac t makes i t  an affirma tive duty to 
repor t test results for new chemicals , }  Some actions, such as 
lying ,  failing to follow "good labora tory prac tices , "  failing to 
repor t test resul ts , and failing to warn of the current h a z ard 
assessment mny be considered direc tly bl�mewor thy, calling for 
liabili ty or other sanctions (possibly including punitive damages 
or criminal penalties} , 
The principle of responsibility as own cost bearing says 
that the initial assignment of liability should be to the risk 
maker. I have mentioned the excuses of coercion and ignorance, 
To flesh out the no tion of liability corresponding to the 
responsibility principle we need to address the rela ted issues of 
reassignmen t of liability and warnings . 
Once assigned , can liability be realloca ted through 
contracting? I would think this should be allowed in many cases 
where there is volun tary choice. The tradi tional requisites for 
volunt ary choice are information and lack of coercion (jus t the 
reverse of the condi tions for involuntary choice used in the 
excuses from the responsibility principle . )  The conditions tha t 
employees are as well informed as mana gemen t as to the na ture of 
the risks and have a baseline of "good" al terna tive j ob 
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oppor tunities appear to satisfy the requisites, The example of a 
welder who has o ther high paying j ob oppor tunities but agrees to 
work on a bridge for extra hazard pay, knowing the extra risk , 
seems to be a case in point, 
It is sometimes argued that when a risk maker provides a 
warning, he should be "of f  the hook" to cus tomers and employees , 
on the grounds that customers and employees could have contracted 
out ,  but volun tarily assumed the risk. But for voluntary 
assump tion of risk the warning mus t correc tly conveyed the 
existing information abou t risk , it mus t be correctly in terpreted, 
and ·there mus t be no coercion. To some extent these conditions of 
voluntary agency and voluntary assumption of risk .can be checked 
if there is an actual contrac t reassigning the risk bearing, but 
because these conditions of volun tary agency on the part of B the 
recipien t are of ten only partially me t ,  mere warnings should not 
be readily assumed to alter the initial assignment of liabili ty to 
the risk maker. To provide an incentive to warn , where u warning 
is desirable , a warning can be treated as an affirmative duty with 
san ctions for failure to warn . 
Jn the airline industry it is generally understood that 
safety is par·t of the cost of doing business , and the airline (or 
manufacturer) should pay for the consequences of accidents without 
a t tempting to excuse i tself by means of warnings , O ther risks , 
called "ultra-hazardous , "  are also without excuse from warning. 
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Traditionally this simple form of s tric t  liability has been 
reserved for particular risks , such as blasting or keeping wild 
animals, The risks of toxic chemicals are surely as grave as 
those from keeping animals ; but more generally the simple form of 
s tric t  liability , withou t excuse from warning , can be applied 
where risks are viewed as cos ts of doing business. 
We can compare the simple version of s tric t  liabili ty 
( without excuse from warning) with the curren t form of s tric t  
liability and two versions o f  a negligence s tandard. Consider the 
following example in which firm X produces a chemical . At the 
time of its production decision , which is at the time of exposure 
to Y1 , Y2 , • • •  , Yn who are employees , cus tomers , and the public a t
large , the firm assesses the probability o f  toxicity to be p ,  
Associated with i ts production o f  the chemical are net bene fi ts B ,  
which include the sales revenue minus labor cos ts , e t c. ,  and 
c1 , c2 , .. . , Cn the "excess" health cos ts to Y1 , Y2 , .. . , Yn if the
chemical is toxic (and each Ci ; 0 if the chemical is not toxic) . 
We suppose tha t i t  is later learned , with vir tual certain t y ,  that 
the chemical is toxic (examples of vinyl chloride , asbes tos , and 
BOIE come to mind) . Y1 sues the firm. 
Under the simple version of s tric t  liabili ty the firm pays 
c1 to Y1 , and Ci to each Yi that can be identified . Under the
current version of liability for toxic chemicals , liability is 
s tric t  bu t with the impor tant provision that if the harm is to be 
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an employee or customer , this form is exempt from liability if it 
"adequately" warned of the risk, (there is no exemption from 
liability for "strangers , "  such as third parties affected by an 
environmentally borne risk), Under the first version of the 
negligence standard , the Learned Hand test , the court attempts to 
identify the total harm C � ["ci' and finds liability if pC ) B. 
Schwartz [ 2 6 ]  suggests a second version of the Learned Hand test, 
which is applied to the level of the firm's research. Under this 
version if the level of research is efficient in the sense that 
the expected value of further research is less than the cost of 
undertaking it and if the firm "adequately" warns of the risk , 
then the firm is not liable to its employees and customers, who 
(it is assumed) could have responded to the warning by contracting 
out . An adequate warning would be to report p ,  the firm's 
assessment of the risk obtained from the then current efficient 
level of research . The firm would still be liable for external 
harms to the public at large, but only up to an aggregate amount 
of the firm's (ex ante) calculation of the expected harm , pC, 
The alternative versions of liability can be distinguished 
by what information the court must take into account for each, as 
shown in Table 1, 
There are four things to observe from the comparison , 
First , the fact finding burden for the court is lowest for simple 
strict liability , higher for the current version of strict 
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liability ,  higher for the Hand version, and higher still for the 
Schwartz version . Second, if there were "perfect markets and 
perfect courts" all four would lead to an efficient level of 
research and risk generation by a particular firm [27] . Third, 
only simple strict liability satisfies the responsibility 
principle. The responsibility principle is not satisfied for the 
Hand version of negligence because risks under the negligence 
standard are free from the firm's point of view , even though they 
entail real costs , in expectation and on average , to others . Both 
the current version of strict liability and Schwartz' version of 
negligence allows exemption to arise from warning, In addition 
Schwartz would allow the unknowability excuse for risks of toxic 
chemicals. I will pursue this excuse of ignorance in more detail. 
I hove already briefly discussed how in some situations 
lack of information could be an excuse from the responsibility 
principle. Fletcher gives the example of Smith y. Lampe , which 
illustrates the appeal of the excuse . The defendant ,  seeing from 
the shore a tugboat looming out of a dense fog toward him, honked 
his horn to warn the boot away. Unknown to the de fendant , his 
warning interfered with a prearranged signal , which was to lead 
the tug to harbor , and consequently the tug ran aground, We might 
well agree that it was not "reasonably foreseeable" for the 
defendant to know about the signal and he should not have been 
reasonably expected to have found out about it. ( In Bayesian 
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terms, the defendant's state space reasonably does not include the 
eventuality which occurred,) 
The situation is different for a chemical firm, In 
designing, producing, and marketing a chemical, the firm is 
creating a lottery of known structure. Further the firm knows a 
lot about B, C and p. The possible eventuality of toxicity is 
clearly foreseeable, given the long history and study of toxic 
properties of chemicals, Indeed the possible eventuality of 
toxicity is one of the first things a firm thinks about in 
deciding whether, and under what conditions, to produce a 
chemical, From the tens of thousands of chemicals already tested, 
a firm can estimate that roughly 4 percent of the universe of 
commercial chemicals is carcinogenic and 15 percent toxic in some 
form [ 28 ] ,  Thus if a firm did no testing and knew "nothing" about 
a new chemical, and it was "randomly" drawn from the universe of 
potentially commercial chemicals, it would still be readily 
foreseeable that the chemical had roughly a 4 percent chance of 
being carcinogenic and a 15 percent chance of being toxic in some 
form, 
Of course a firm typically knows much· more about the 
chemical -- it knows the geometric structure of the molecule, the 
properties of closely related chemicals, and probably the results 
of at least some tests. Stopping at its efficient level of 
research, the firm's current probability p is (or should be) an 
38 
unbiased estimate of the posterior probability which would arise 
from further research. (In Bayesian terms, the possible 
eventuality of toxicity is reasonably an element of the firm's 
state space, and the firm has a reasonable basis upon which to 
construct its prior and posterior probabilities,) Along with this 
information, a firm typically has some information on production 
and exposure, and hence B,C1,,,,,Cn , Taking all this information 
into account, the firm makes many complicated choices, concerning 
the design of the molecule, the amount of testing, manufacturing 
and use restrictions, production volume, and so on, True, these 
choices are choices under uncertainty, but this is how we make 
almost all of our choices. 
The firm voluntarily chooses to make the lottery, and in 
fact tailors the branches of the lottery by its design, testing, 
production and marketing decisions, Typically the chemical 
manufacturing firm has better information on the lottery than 
anyone else, The fact that the firm does not know precisely the 
probabilities of the lotteries it creates does not make, by 
itself, its choice involuntary or the excuse of ignorance 
applicable, On the contrary, as long as the potential 
consequences are foreseeable, one might conclude that it is more 
important to make a firm responsible for partially known risks 
than for fully known risks, because the former interfere more with 
the recipients' autonomy, being more difficult to defend against, 
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In short, the ignorance excuse, as I h ave interpreted it , 
would apply to Smith y, Lampe , but rarely for toxic chemicals . In 
contrast , Schwart z' ignorance excuse would apply virtually all the 
time. In virtually every case, the full extent of a chemical risk 
is not fully known with any finite level of res earch, let alone an 
e fficient amount. 
The fourth observation to make from the comparison in 
Table 1 is that because the last three versions of liability do 
not incorporate the responsibility principle , they will generate 
incentives to misrepresent . Referring to Table 1 ,  we s e e  that 
under simple strict liability, the only opportunity for a firm to 
misrepresent is to argue that the cost of the toxic harm, c1 , is 
lower than it actually is , However , the firm has no special 
priv ate information on the plainti f f ' s  harm , which is there for 
the court to assess directly . Under the current version of strict 
liability, the court must also assess the adequacy of the 
warnings , The firm has an incentive to represent the state of 
information , at the time of the warning, as indicating a low risk 
nnd the harm as "totally unexpected , "  perhaps "unknowable . " Part 
of the court's difficulty is that information on this firm ' s  
j u dgement o f  p is priv ate to the firm , and thus easier to 
misrepresent , Under Hand ' s  negligence standard the incentives to 
misrepresent are larger . It is to the advantage of the firm to 
argue that B is larger than i l  actually is, and p and C smaller . 
Representations about B in addition to p, involve private 
information to the firm . 
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Un der Schwartz '  version of negligence, the incentives are 
again larger , In addition to the incentives of the first 
negligence standard,  the firm has incentives to misrepresent on 
both the cost of his research activity and its expected value of 
information , One of the most difficult tasks in implementing the 
excuse of ignorance is reconstructing the firm ' s  judgmental 
probabilities at the time of t esting (and its decision not to test 
further } .  These probabilities include the then current 
(subj ective) probability of toxicity (at v arious potency levels) 
and what the probabilities would be if further testing had been 
done (each con ditional on a possible outcome of a candidate test) . 
By de finition proper scoring rules are the only mechanisms with 
dominant strategies not to misrepresent probability assessments 
(assuming risk neutrality) . But proper scoring rules can be shown 
equivalent to simple strict liability rules [29) . 
The enormous difficulty of reconstructing what a firm knew 
and how it assess e d  the probabilities,  years before the inj ury 
became apparent, is illustrate d  in the example of Rohm and H a as . 
Jn Senate testimony [ 30) representativ es of Rohm and llaas argu e d  
that i t  knew little about the risk until about 1972. 
Representatives for the workers found in a questionnaire that a 
company doctor had writ ten that B OIE had been observed by 1967 to 
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be l inked w i th increased lung cancer . There followed an 
acr imon ious debate as to whether the doctor who s igned the 
quest iona ire was the plant physician or the Corporate Medical 
Director who might have s igned for the plant phys ician , and 
whether the quest ionaire was m islead ing , as the Corporate Med ical 
Director claimed. Ascertain ing these ttfactstt is j ust the 
beg inning in an evaluation of an ignorance excuse, 
If the unknowab ility excuse is not allowed , but the r isk 
imposer is held str ictly l iable whether or not the expected value 
of informat ion exceeded the costs of gather ing it,  the r isk m�ker 
has an incent ive to undertake an efficient amount of research 
w i thout an incentive to m isrepresent research cost , the 
probab ilit ies or the ex ante expected value of information, There 
is no incent ive to m isrepresent these assessments because 
liabil ity does not depend upon these representat ions, 
Compared w i th negl igence standards and the unknowab ility 
excuse , strict l iability, as an application of the respons ibil ity 
principle, decreases but does not eliminate all the incent ives for 
misrepresentat ion. Jn toxics cases, it is often uncer tain whether 
a chem ical has caused an inj ury, Thus , even w i th simple strict 
l iabil ity there are incent ives for the risk imposer and the 
inj ured part ies to m isrepresent on the issues of causality and the 
extent of the harm, The point here is not that strict l iab il ity 
eliminates incent ives to m isrepresent , but that negl igence has the 
same incent ives to misrepresent plus additional ones [31] . 
VI Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to show the close connection 
between ( i) the part ial princ iple of responsibil ity as own cost 
bear ing, ( i i) incentives compat ibil i ty ,  and ( i i i) efficiency, 
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Util itarian ism , and efficiency, are usually viewed as 
being outcome-oriented, Responsibil ity, as d iscussed in th is 
paper , is act ion-or iented . But in the vocabulary of game forms , 
which I have used as a common language in the paper , actions and 
outcomes are closely related. Individuals take a c t ions by 
choos ing strategies , Jointly , as a result of all the strategy 
choices ( including nature's when there is uncertainty) , an outcome 
affect ing all the individuals is determ ined, By taking into 
account how one indiv idual's action affects others' well-be ing , 
inst i tut ions can be des igned w i th greater incentive compatib il ity, 
Responsibil ity is j ust if ied primarily on the grounds of 
fairness in the ass ignment of cost, That the responsiblity 
princ iple also has efficient incent ive properties adds to i ts 
normat ive appeal. We do not have to choose between the 
respons ibil ity and eff ic iency princ iples , we can choose both, 
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Table 1 
Court must take into account 
Strict liability (simple) 
Strict liability (current) 
Negligence (Hand) 
Negligence (Schwart z) 
Notes : Ce cost of test ; pk revised probability of toxicity 
if the test outcome is k ;  Allk optimal change in benefits if the
test leads to pk ; aC� expected change in harm to i if the f i rm 
reacts optimally to possible test result k ;  K the number of 
possible test results ; n the number at risk . 
